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HOW TO CREATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE
CASE OF INTERNET FREEDOM IN CHINA
KATHERINE TSAI*
INTRODUCTION
In early 2010, Google, Inc. (“Google”) announced that it was no
longer willing to assist the People’s Republic of China (“China”) with
censoring Google search engine results in mainland China. Google
subsequently disabled Google.cn and redirected web users to
Google.com.hk, an uncensored search portal based in Hong Kong.
Google’s actions prompted spirited responses from both the United States
and Chinese governments, and exposed a fundamental difference between
the two countries’ ideologies regarding internet freedom. Like Google, the
United States stressed the importance of internet freedom to human rights
and trade. In contrast, China claimed that internet freedom was another
variation of Western imperialism and would cause political instability.
Unlike China, this Note begins from the premise that internet freedom is a
desirable norm that can encourage government accountability, advance
educational goals, and spur artistic and scientific innovation. Based on this
premise, this Note examines how the United States, a state actor, and
Google, a non-state actor, may achieve internet freedom in China through
the creation of international law.
This Note constructs a variant of one scholar’s theory of international
law to explore the ways in which state and non-state actors can induce
internet freedom through international law. In How International Law
Works: A Rational Choice Theory, Professor Andrew Guzman uses the
concept of the “Three Rs of Compliance” or “reputation, reciprocity, and
retaliation” to explain why state actors comply with existing hard and soft
international law (“legal” and “quasi-legal” agreements, respectively).1
This Note expands Guzman’s rational choice theory by applying it to state
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actors and the creation of international rules. When applied to the creation
of international law, the original definitions of Guzman’s reputation,
reciprocity, and retaliation evolve into a new concept that this Note terms
the “Three Rs of Cooperation.” The Three Rs of Cooperation—a variation
of Guzman’s rational choice theory—describe why a state actor might enter
into a new international agreement. This Note applies the Three Rs of
Cooperation to the circumstances of early 2010 to explain how China may
one day enter an international agreement guaranteeing internet freedom to
its citizens.
In developing the Three Rs of Cooperation, this Note broadens
Guzman’s rational choice theory to include non-state actors. Although
Guzman’s original theory only analyzes the role of state actors in
international law, it is necessary to examine the role of non-state actors in
this context because of their significant influence in shaping the
international conversation concerning internet freedom. A “non-state actor”
is used primarily in this Note to describe multinational companies such as
Google or Microsoft Corp. (“Microsoft”) that are capable of influencing
state behavior.
Although the rhetoric employed by Google and the United States
frames internet freedom as an essential human right,2 this Note does not
discuss how internet freedom may be achieved through human rights
instruments. Human rights instruments that protect the freedom of
expression, such as Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights,3 Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights,4 and customary international law are arguably not binding
obligations upon China, even if freedom of expression may be said to
encompass internet freedom.5 The question of whether existing legal

2. See, e.g., Hillary Rodham Clinton, U.S. Sec’y of State, Remarks on Internet Freedom (Jan. 21,
2010) (transcript available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/01/135519.htm); see also
“Google and Internet Control in China: A Nexus Between Human Rights and Trade?” Hearing Before
the Congressional-Exec. Commission on China, 111th Cong. 34-37 (2010) [hereinafter Davidson
Testimony] (testimony of Alan Davidson, Director of Public Policy, Google Inc.), available at
http://www.scribd.com/doc/28866040/032410-Alan-Davidson-Testimony.
3. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, art. 19, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess.,
183d plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948).
4. Int’l Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) A, art. 19, U.N. GAOR,
21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966).
5. First, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is a nonbinding agreement. Second, China
has not ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and technically has no
obligation to uphold the substantive obligations of the treaty. See Status of the Int’l Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, U.N. T. Collection, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src
=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-4&chapter=4&lang=en (last visited Feb 10, 2011). Finally, it is arguable
whether internet freedom has existed long enough under the banner of freedom of expression to
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obligations require China to provide internet freedom to its citizens is
outside the scope of this Note.
In summary, this Note fashions a theory that explains state
cooperation with the creation of international law by building upon
Guzman’s theory of state compliance with existing international law, and
applies this theory to the context of internet freedom in China. Part I
discusses the events surrounding Google’s withdrawal from China in early
2010. Part II summarizes Guzman’s rational choice theory of international
law. Part III redefines the role of reciprocity, retaliation, and reputation in
the Three Rs of Cooperation, a variation of Guzman’s rational choice
theory. It uses the Three Rs of Cooperation to contemplate how the actions
of both state and non-state actors can create international law. Part IV
examines how state and non-state actors may use the Three Rs of
Cooperation most effectively. It also considers how the choice between the
hard and soft law forms may aggravate or mollify China’s objections to a
potential agreement that establishes internet freedom in China. Ultimately,
this Note concludes that the United States and Google are most likely to
achieve internet freedom in China through the concurrent use of the Three
Rs of Cooperation, the collaboration of other state and non-state actors, and
the soft law form.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On January 12, 2010, Google announced that sophisticated hackers in
China had targeted several prominent U.S. companies and stolen valuable
intellectual property from Google.6 Perhaps more seriously, these cyber
constitute customary international law. In particular, China has adamantly denied that it has violated the
freedom of expression. Rather, China refers to Google’s withdrawal and the United States’ subsequent
call to promote internet freedom as “information imperialism.” Opinion, The Real Stake in “Free Flow
of
Information,”
GLOBAL
TIMES
(Jan.
22,
2010),
available
at
http://
opinion.globaltimes.cn/editorial/2010-01/500324.html. This Note refers to English language editorials
and articles from Chinese state-run newspapers—for instance, Xinhua, China Daily, and Global
Times—as indicative of the Chinese government’s public stance. These editorials and articles represent
the message that the Chinese government desires to convey to its own people and the international
community.
See
Worldpress.org,
World
Newspapers
and
Magazines,
China,
http://www.worldpress.org/newspapers/asia/china.cfm (listing affiliations of major newspapers in
China); China’s State-Run Media Chastise Google, CBS NEWS (Mar. 22, 2010), available at
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/03/22/business/main6322336.shtml (arguing that the Chinese
government reportedly told news editors to “get on message” criticizing Google); Tania Branigan,
China Defies Media Cuts and Closures with New Newspaper Launch, THE GUARDIAN (U.K.) (Apr. 20,
2009), available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/apr/20/china-newspaper-launch (describing
the launch of Global Times as a “part of the Chinese government's drive to promote its views to an
international audience and reshape the country's reputation”).
6. David Drummond, A New Approach to China, THE OFFICIAL GOOGLE BLOG (Jan. 12, 2010),
http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2010/01/new-approach-to-china.html.
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attackers had “routinely accessed” the Gmail accounts of Chinese,
American, and European human rights supporters.7 Although Google never
accused the Chinese government directly,8 Google declared that it was no
longer willing to help the Chinese government censor search results on
Google.cn, and that it was reviewing the feasibility of its continued
operations in China.9 Google’s accusations were confirmed when
diplomatic cables leaked to WikiLeaks revealed that the Chinese Politburo
directed “computer sabotage . . . [of Google], American government
computers, . . . Western allies, . . . and American businesses.”10
Less than a week following Google’s announcement, the U.S.
government promoted internet freedom from “a piece of . . . foreign policy
arcana” to the forefront of its foreign policy agenda.11 Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton stated that “new technologies do not take sides in the
struggle for freedom and progress, but the United States does. We stand for
a single internet where all of humanity has equal access to knowledge and
ideas.”12 Secretary of State Clinton directed her speech toward all
repressive countries, but specifically named China as a state that threatens
“the free flow of information.”13 She referred to the conflict involving
Google and China, stating that she expected “Chinese authorities to
conduct a thorough review of the cyber intrusions that led Google to make
its announcement.”14
Chinese media swiftly denounced the U.S. government’s criticisms of
China as a repressive country. For instance, Xinhua, a government-owned
Chinese newspaper, requested that the United States “stop unreasonable
accusations on China in the name of so-called Internet Freedom.”15
Government officials asserted that, far from restricting internet freedom,
“[t]he Chinese constitution protects . . . citizens’ freedom of speech” and

7. Id. Gmail is a web-based email service provided by Google.
8. Davidson Testimony, supra note 2, at 35.
9. Id.
10. Scott Shane & Andrew W. Lehren, Leaked Cables Offer Raw Look at U.S. Diplomacy, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 28, 2010), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/29/world/29cables.html.
11. Alec Ross, Senior Advisor for Innovation, U.S. State Dep’t, State Dep’t Officials Brief
Reporters on Internet Freedom (Jan. 22, 2010), available at http://www.america.gov/st/texttransenglish/2010/January/20100123124856SBlebahC1.357234e-02.html.
12. Clinton, supra note 2.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. China Urges U.S. to Stop Accusations on So-Called Internet Freedom, XINHUA (Jan. 22,
2010), available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2010-01/22/c_13147126.htm. For
information on Xinhua as a government-owned Chinese newspaper, see Worldpress.org, supra note 5.
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“China’s internet is open.”16 China Daily, also a state-run newspaper,
stressed that the internet in China promotes “social democracy and
pluralism” because it is “one of the major channels for people to offer tips
on abuse of power by officials and lodge complaints about wrongdoings by
governments at all levels.”17 The newspaper also claimed that the United
States has no cause to criticize China for repressing information on the
internet, because the internet has evidently caused “economic and political
reform” and improved freedom of speech in China.18
Chinese media argued that the U.S. government was attempting to
impose “information[al] imperialism” upon China and other developing
countries by demanding universal access to an open internet.19 Chinese
media described Secretary of State Clinton’s call for “an unrestricted
Internet . . . [as] a disguised attempt to impose its values on other cultures
in the name of democracy.”20 A Chinese editorial described the U.S.
government’s appeal to internet freedom as “smart sanctions” meant to
“export democracy” and thereby instigate a change in government
regime.21 The Global Times criticized the concept of “freedom of speech”
as “an aggressive political and diplomatic strategy, rather than a desire for
moral values.”22 Because many countries cannot match the “informational
control and dissemination” of Western countries, an unrestricted internet
would be tantamount to further disadvantaging non-Western nations.23 To
support its accusations, Chinese media noted that the United States had

16. Id.
17. Internet Safety, Order, CHINA DAILY (Jan. 23, 2010), available at http://
www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2010-01/23/content_9365529.htm. For information on China Daily as a
state-run newspaper, see Worldpress.org, supra note 5.
18. Id.
19. The Real Stake in “Free Flow of Information,” supra note 5.
20. Id.
21. Googling Sanction Targets, CHINA DAILY (Mar. 18, 2010), available at http://
www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2010-03/18/content_9606924.htm (quoting Adam Szubin, a director of
the U.S. Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets).
22. The Real Stake in “Free Flow of Information,” supra note 5. See also Ian Buruma, Battling
the Information Barbarians, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 29, 2010), available at http://online.wsj.com/
article/SB10001424052748704878904575031263063242900.html (explaining that Chinese officials
often view criticism of their human rights policy or politics “as an attack on Chinese culture” or “an
attempt to ‘denigrate China’”). The Global Times is affiliated with People’s Daily, a newspaper run by
the Chinese Communist Party. See Worldpress.org, supra note 5.
23. The Real Stake in “Free Flow of Information,” supra note 5. The Chinese argument appears
to assert that because information production in the United States outpaces information production in
China and non-Western nations, citizens of non-Western nations would be unfairly swayed to believe
that democracy is the correct form of governance. Thus, restrictions on the internet are necessary to
level the ideological playing field.
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recently formed a cyber warfare division24 and that shortly before Google’s
announcement on January 12, 2010, the Secretary of State dined with “the
leaders of the powerful information enterprises such as . . . Microsoft,
Twitter and Google.”25 Chinese media thereby implied that the United
States government was conspiring with American information industry
giants to topple China.
Although China claims that it censors only websites that encourage
violence or terrorism or that disseminate illicit material such as child
pornography,26 several nonprofit and human rights organizations have
reported that the Chinese government actively engages in censorship and
repressive activities that extend far beyond its claims.27 Besides actively
censoring websites,28 the Chinese government controls the rapid spread of
“negative news reports” on the internet using an approach called “Control
2.0.”29 Under Control 2.0, the Chinese government nullifies the

24. Commentary, Don’t Impose Double Standards on “Internet Freedom,” XINHUA (Jan. 24,
2010), available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2010-01/24/c_13148512.htm.
25. Google, Do Not Take Chinese Netizens Hostage, XINHUA (Jan. 20, 2010), available at http://
news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/indepth/2010-01/20/c_13143639.htm.
26. See, e.g., Don’t Impose Double Standards on “Internet Freedom,” supra note 24 (defending
China’s restrictions on the internet by pointing out that the United States also regulates terrorist and
pornographic activities on the internet); China Says Internet Regulation Legitimate and Reasonable,
XINHUA (Jan. 25, 2010), available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/201001/25/c_13149272.htm (noting that Chinese internet regulations are based on, inter alia, the Law on the
Protection of Minors).
27. See, e.g., Joanne Leedom-Ackerman, The Intensifying Battle Over Internet Freedom, THE
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (Feb. 24, 2009), available at http://www.csmonitor.com/
Commentary/Opinion/2009/0224/p09s01-coop.html (noting that China is “particularly adept at blocking
Internet use” and “leads the list of countries with . . . the highest number of writers in prison”). See also
Global Internet Freedom: Corporate Responsibility and the Rule of Law: Hearing Before the S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on Human Rights and the Law, 110th Cong. (May 20, 2008) (testimony of
Arvind Ganesan, Director, Business and Human Rights Program, Human Rights Watch), available at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=3369&wit_id=7184 (“We also learned that US
companies, including Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo!, censor their search engines in China, in
anticipation of what Chinese censors expect and in addition to what the Chinese government’s firewall
prohibits.”).
28. Andrew Jacobs, Chinese Learn Limits of Online Freedom as the Filter Tightens, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 4, 2009), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/05/world/asia/05beijing.html (reporting
that a Chinese Internet affairs bureau official admonished his peers “to check the channels one by one,
the programs one by one, the pages one by one”). See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, “RACE TO
THE BOTTOM”: CORPORATE COMPLICITY IN CHINESE INTERNET CENSORSHIP 18:8 (C) (2006), available
at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/china0806webwcover.pdf (describing the Chinese
government’s curtailment of freedom of expression on the Internet and the complicity of multinational
companies including Yahoo!, Microsoft, Google, and Skype); OPENNET INITIATIVE, INTERNET
FILTERING IN CHINA (2009), available at http://opennet.net/sites/opennet.net/files/ONI_China_2009.pdf
(describing the Chinese government’s posture toward Internet censorship).
29. OPENNET INITIATIVE, supra note 28, at 3.

TSAI_PROOF3

2011]

3/28/2011 2:54:50 PM

INTERNET FREEDOM IN CHINA

407

dissemination of damaging information by issuing “‘authoritative’ facts”
through “state news agencies such as Xinhua and the People’s Daily.”30
After weeks of silence,31 Google finally announced in late March 2010
that it was automatically diverting mainland Chinese internet users from its
censored Google.cn search engine to its uncensored Google.com.hk search
engine based in Hong Kong.32 In the weeks preceding the announcement,
the Chinese government refused to make any concessions regarding
China’s internet policy during talks with Google.33 In fact, far from
relaxing its policies, China strengthened its censorship and surveillance
practices in April 2010 by amending the Protection of State Secrets Law, so
that the government could force foreign companies to release information
on their customers relating to “leaks of state secrets.”34 The amendment
gives the Chinese government great power, due to the fact that “[a]lmost
any information can be classified as a state secret in China . . . even
information [that is] publicly circulated.”35
Google maintained its stance against censorship through June 2010,
but it backed down from its original threat to leave China.36 On June 30,
2010, Google’s Internet Content Provider license was due to be renewed by
the Chinese government.37 Without a renewed license, Google would not
be able to operate in China, and the Chinese government made it plain that
it would not renew the company’s license if Google continued to redirect
mainland Chinese users of Google.cn to Google.com.hk.38 In order to
comply with China’s demands and yet not abandon the moral high ground
of its stance against censorship, Google stopped automatically redirecting
mainland Chinese internet users in June 2010 from Google.cn to
Google.com.hk,39 but provided a link on Google.cn so that users could still

30. Id. at 3-4.
31. Kevin Voigt, China Partners to Google: Decide Now, CNN (Mar. 17, 2010), available at
http://www.cnn.com/2010/BUSINESS/03/17/china.google.letter/index.html.
32. Miguel Helft & David Barboza, Google Shuts China Site in Dispute Over Censorship, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 22, 2010), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/23/technology/23google.html.
33. Elinor Mills, In Post-Google China, Censorship is Unfazed, CNET NEWS (Mar. 26, 2010),
http://news.cnet.com/8301-27080_3-20001212-245.html.
34. Sky Canaves, Beijing Revises Law on State Secrets, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 29, 2010), available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703572504575213944098022692.html;
see
also
Kathrin Hille, China Includes Internet in Secrets Law Revision, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2010), available
at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/d7944740-537d-11df-bfdf-00144feab49a.html.
35. Canaves, supra note 34.
36. Helft & Barboza, supra note 32.
37. David Drummond, An Update on China, THE OFFICIAL GOOGLE BLOG (June 28, 2010),
http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2010/06/update-on-china.html.
38. Id.
39. Id.
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click through to Google.com.hk.40 By doing so, Google complied with
China’s regulations and successfully renewed its Internet Content Provider
license.41
While Google could have remained silent regarding the cyber attacks
like other victimized companies,42 it instead vocally campaigned against
internet censorship. Google executives called for the U.S. government to
prioritize internet freedom in U.S. foreign policy, arguing that internet
censorship creates human rights violations and barriers to trade.43 Google
offered several methods to combat internet censorship; for instance, Google
suggested that U.S. companies could disclose any requests by foreign
governments for companies to censor information or to produce personal
information concerning their clients.44 To demonstrate its commitment to
transparency and the freedom of expression, Google unveiled on April 20,
2010 a new online tool that discloses government requests received by
Google for “user data or content removal.”45
Google’s influence on state policy and its focus on human rights,
transparency, and freedom of expression has prompted journalists and
academics to describe Google as a quasi-state.46 In February 2010, Sergey
Brin, Co-Founder of Google and President of Google’s Technology

40. Id.
41. Id. Many interpreted Google’s actions to appease the Chinese government so that Google’s
license could be renewed to mean that Google had lost its battle against censorship in China. Surojit
Chatterjee, Google Seen Losing Censorship Battle Against China Govt, May Lose License, INT’L BUS.
TIMES (July 1, 2010), available at http://www.ibtimes.com/articles/32005/20100701/google-seenlosing-censorship-battle-against-china-govt-may-lose-license.htm.
42. John Markoff, Cyberattack on Google Said to Hit Password System, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 19,
2010), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/20/technology/20google.html.
43. Davidson Testimony, supra note 2, at 36.
44. Id. at 36-37.
45. David Drummond, Greater Transparency Around Government Requests, THE OFFICIAL
GOOGLE BLOG (Apr. 20, 2010), http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2010/04/greater-transparency-aroundgovernment.html; see also Google, Transparency Report: Government Requests, http://
www.google.com/governmentrequests/ (follow “China” hyperlink) (last visited May 22, 2010). Data
regarding China is markedly absent from this tool, because “Chinese officials consider censorship
demands as state secrets.” Id.
46. The quasi-state nature of powerful multinational companies is not new; the British East India
Company is a famous example. See Peter Marshall, The British Presence in India in the 18th Century,
BBC (Nov. 5, 2009), http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/empire_seapower/east_india_01.shtml; see
also Jeffrey Rosen, Google’s Gatekeepers, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Nov. 28, 2008), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/30/magazine/30google-t.html (“‘To love Google, you have to be a
little bit of a monarchist, you have to have faith in the way people traditionally felt about the king,’ Tim
Wu, a Columbia law professor and a former scholar in residence at Google, told me recently. ‘One
reason they’re good at the moment is they live and die on trust, and as soon as you lose trust in Google,
it’s over for them.’”).
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division,47 stated that Google chose to enter the Chinese market in 2006 not
out of a desire to increase revenue streams, but rather to do “what’s best for
the Chinese people.”48 For Google to focus on “what’s best” for a people
rather than solely on its profit margin is a remarkable “mixing and
matching of the interests of what a nation-state is all about and what a
corporation is all about.”49 Google’s need to have a foreign policy
regarding government censorship in foreign jurisdictions arises from the
fact that what it is providing to other countries “isn’t a product or a service,
it’s a freedom.”50 Its role as a distributor of information forces Google to
absolutely need[] a foreign policy, and it needs a foreign policy about
free speech, and about privacy, and about intellectual property, and
about the whole range of issues that a society confronts . . . .
[especially because Google] seem[s] to be more concerned about free
speech than a lot of the countries that they are interacting with as a
foreign power.51

Google’s ability to attract the attention of both the United States and
Chinese governments simply by threatening to cease business operations in
China not only points to Google’s quasi-state nature and its consequent
need for a foreign policy, but also Google’s unique capacity to influence
international law.
II. A RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
This Part summarizes Guzman’s rational choice theory of state
compliance with international law and describes the three mechanisms by
which a state calculates the costs and benefits of compliance. This Part
concludes with Guzman’s explanation of why hard and soft international
law may be functionally equivalent in terms of affecting state behavior.

47. Google,
Corporate
Information:
Google
Management,
http://www.google.com/corporate/execs.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2010).
48. Interview by Chris Anderson, TED Curator, with Sergey Brin, Co-founder and President,
Technology, Google Inc., at TED2010 (Feb. 24, 2010), available at http://blog.ted.com/2010/02/
our_focus_has_b.php.
49. Interview by John Hockenberry, host of The Takeaway, with Jeffrey Rosen, professor of law
at George Washington Univ. (Apr. 22, 2010), available at http://www.thetakeaway.org/2010/apr/22/
what-googles-foreign-policy/transcript/.
50. Mark Landler, Google Searches for a Foreign Policy, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 27, 2010), available
at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/28/weekinreview/28landler.html (quoting writer Clay Shirky).
51. Interview by John Hockenberry, supra note 49.
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A. The Three Rs of Compliance
Guzman’s How International Law Works: A Rational Choice Theory
explains why states choose to comply with existing international
agreements. Guzman begins from the assumption that a state will only
comply with an international agreement if the benefits of complying with
the agreement exceed the benefits of not complying.52 “Benefit” is defined
loosely—it may be a present or future, reputational or nonreputational gain,
and the state may value a benefit differently at different points in time.53
According to Guzman, a state calculates the benefits of complying with
international agreements by considering three mechanisms deemed “‘the
Three Rs of Compliance’—reputation, reciprocity, and retaliation.”54
Guzman defines reciprocity as actions that are “taken without the
intent to sanction the violator . . . [and are] not costly to the reciprocating
state.”55A typical reciprocal action may consist of one state’s decision to
withdraw from an international agreement because the other state has
chosen to violate the obligation.56 Thus, reciprocal actions are considered
“adjustment[s] in a state’s behavior motivated by a desire to maximize the
state’s payoffs in light of new circumstances or information.”57 Guzman
does not explicitly discuss whether opportunity costs are considered “costs”
for the purpose of defining reciprocal actions. Guzman raises the example
of the Boundary Waters Treaty between the United States and Canada.58 He
posits that if Canada withdrew, then the United States might consider “that
the expected payoff from termination is greater than the expected payoff
from compliance.”59 The United States’ termination of the Boundary
Waters Treaty would be considered a reciprocal action taken in response to
Canada’s violation of the treaty.60 Although the United States would be
better off if both parties upheld the treaty, Guzman does not seem to
consider this lost opportunity cost relevant in determining whether an
action is “costless” and therefore whether it qualifies as a “reciprocal

52. See GUZMAN, supra note 1, at 17 (assuming states are rational and “able to identify and pursue
their interests”).
53. See id. at 56.
54. Id. at 9.
55. Id. at 33.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 44.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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action.”61 Accordingly, this Note assumes that opportunity costs are not
relevant when determining whether actions are “costless.”
Guzman defines retaliation as “actions that are costly to the retaliating
state and [are] intended to punish the violating party.”62 Retaliatory actions
may take the form of “economic, diplomatic, or even military sanctions.”63
They are useful as a “signal to the violating state (and other states) that the
sanctioning state will punish violations,” which in turn “encourage[s] the
violating state” to comply with the existing obligation and deters the
violating state from committing future violations.64
Guzman defines reputation as a state’s “reputation for compliance
with international law.”65 A state may have a different reputation for
compliance for any given area of the law.66 For instance, a state may
possess a positive (or strong) reputation for compliance in trade law but a
negative (or weak) reputation for compliance in environmental law.67 A
positive reputation for compliance in the context of international law
confers credibility upon a state.68 States with positive reputations can more
easily enter into future agreements and extract greater concessions from
other states.69 However, “a state’s reputation will be changed only to the
extent that the state’s behavior differs from what observing states have
expected.”70 Because certain “states would behave consistently with treaty
obligations even if the treaty were not in existence,”71 their compliance
does not improve their reputations. For example, Trinidad and Tobago’s
compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty does not signal
anything regarding its reputation for compliance because it lacks the
infrastructure to develop nuclear weapons and therefore could not feasibly
violate the treaty even if it desired.72

61. See id. at 33, 42-44.
62. Id. at 34.
63. Id. Goldsmith and Posner recognize that promising cash in exchange for a concession may be
functionally indistinguishable from threatening military sanctions against a nation. JACK L. GOLDSMITH
& ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 117-18 (2005).
64. GUZMAN, supra note 1, at 48.
65. Id. at 33.
66. See id. at 100-11.
67. See id. at 109.
68. Id. at 34-35.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 75.
71. Id. at 80.
72. Id. at 79-80.
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B. The Costs and Benefits of Compliance
Because a legal obligation qua legal obligation “is just one of many
factors that affect the incentives of states,”73 a state’s decision to comply
with international law also accounts for both the nonreputational and
reputational payoffs of compliance.74 Nonreputational payoffs include
domestic gains and losses, such as those relating to the domestic economy
or national security,75 and international gains and losses, such as the
potential reciprocal or retaliatory actions taken by other state actors.76
Reputational payoffs include reputational gains and losses that affect the
“many future opportunities for cooperation that require . . . [states] to make
credible promises, or . . . an ongoing relationship with a partner that makes
a good reputation especially valuable.”77 If a state does not perceive the
need to make credible promises in the international community, then
reputational gains are less valuable to such a state.78
C. Soft Law Versus Hard Law
Agreements between state actors may take the form of either hard law
(binding treaties) or soft law (nonbinding agreements) and still influence
state behavior.79 As Guzman explains, the choice between hard and soft
law is not binary, but rather “different points on a spectrum of
commitment.”80 Soft law is generally considered to be “international
agreements that fall short of formal treaties but nevertheless seek to
influence state conduct.”81 Because soft law is nonbinding, states may find
the soft law form attractive because, among other reasons, the reputational
cost of violating a nonbinding agreement is less than the cost of violating a
binding treaty.82 However, the structure of a soft law agreement affects
whether the agreement is functionally binding, if not technically so. For
example, the inclusion of “some form of dispute resolution[,] . . .
monitoring procedures[,] . . . reservations[,] . . . [or] exit and escape
clauses” into the agreement increases or decreases “the seriousness of the

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id. at 15.
Id. at 74-75.
Id. at 78, 82.
See id. at 82.
Id. at 75.
Id. at 75-76.
Id. at 142.
Id. at 144.
Id. at 23, 220 n.27.
Id. at 141.
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commitment.”83 Design elements like these “maximize the credibility” of a
state’s commitment to an international agreement.84 Guzman emphasizes
that the technical form of the international agreement is inconsequential
because what matters to his rational choice theory is the ability of the
agreement to change state behavior.85 Therefore, a nonbinding agreement
can be just as effective as a formal treaty in changing state behavior.
III. THE THREE RS OF COOPERATION
This Part builds upon Guzman’s “Three Rs of Compliance” to explain
how internet freedom can be achieved through a new international
agreement. Because of Google’s ability to advance internet freedom from
an arcane U.S. foreign policy point to a hotly contested international issue,
this Part examines the ability of both state and non-state actors to affect the
payoffs for China of creating an agreement that establishes internet
freedom. To do this, this Note employs a new explanatory mechanism
called the “Three Rs of Cooperation.”
The Three Rs of Cooperation applies Guzman’s concepts of
reputation, retaliation, and reciprocity to the creation of international law.
The Three Rs of Cooperation are nominally identical to Guzman’s Three
Rs of Compliance, but these Rs take on different significance when applied
to the creation of, and not compliance with, international law. In particular,
rather than examining a state’s reputation for compliance with international
law, as Guzman does, this Note examines a state’s reputation for
cooperation with respect to the creation of international law.
This Part first discusses the importance of China’s reputation for
cooperation in the context of internet freedom. Next, it discusses the
reciprocal and retaliatory actions that state and non-state actors could take
to influence Chinese policy on internet freedom. Finally, it discusses
China’s domestic concerns in deciding whether to adopt internet freedom.
A. Reputational Payoffs
The greatest difference between the “Three Rs of Compliance” and
the “Three Rs of Cooperation” concerns reputation. In Guzman’s theory, a
state’s decision to comply or not comply with an existing international
agreement affects the state’s reputation for compliance.86 In the context of
creating international agreements, a state’s reputation for cooperation is

83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 134.
Id. at 135.
See id.
Id. at 73-82.

TSAI_PROOF3

414

3/28/2011 2:54:50 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol 21:401

affected by its decision to work with other states to create an international
agreement. Thus, a state’s reputation for cooperation improves when it (1)
actively contributes to diplomatic negotiations or talks; (2) participates in
the writing and production of an international agreement; (3) signs an
international agreement; and/or (4) ratifies an international agreement.87 A
state’s compliance with an existing agreement also adds to its reputation for
cooperation. When a state engages in any of the above actions, other states
perceive that the state is striving to achieve a shared goal of creating and
implementing new international law. Each of the above actions individually
contributes to a state’s reputation for cooperation,88 but, when combined,
these actions garner a larger increase in reputational capital for a state than
a single action alone.
In the context of creating international agreements, a state is
concerned about its reputation for cooperation.89 A positive reputation for
cooperation signals that a state is willing to solve mutual problems with
other state actors through international law. State actors would perceive
such a state as a “team player,” and would approach the state with
relatively more trust and candor.90 If one temporarily disregards a state’s
economic or political might, a state with a positive reputation for
cooperation will be more readily approached to create new agreements.
State actors may hesitate before conferring with uncooperative states, if at
all. Uncooperative states are less willing to work with other states to craft
an agreement, and consequently state actors are more likely to work
“around” uncooperative states, perhaps excluding such states from the
process of crafting an international solution altogether.
A state’s reputation for cooperation correlates with its reputation for
compliance. State actors may be attracted to entering agreements with a
state that possesses a positive cooperative reputation because it is more
likely that such a state will comply with the resulting agreement. Granted, a
state’s positive reputation for cooperation will not guarantee its compliance
with an agreement. Unforeseen events that occur between crafting the
agreement and complying with the agreement may change the state’s
reputational and nonreputational payoffs.91 However, a state that sacrifices

87. A state’s signing or ratification of a legal obligation does not necessarily signal a state’s
compliance with the treaty. See id. at 78, 177-79.
88. For instance, one can imagine a state that participates in treaty talks in good faith, but later
ceases any further cooperation due to domestic disapproval.
89. See GUZMAN, supra note 1, at 33.
90. See id. at 34-35.
91. See supra notes 73-78 and accompanying text. Alternatively, the state may simply have
entered the agreement negotiations in bad faith.
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significant amounts of time and effort at the negotiating table
correspondingly becomes more invested in the agreement’s success.
Cooperating with the creation of an agreement now means the state will
likely comply with the agreement later. Furthermore, after agreement
negotiations conclude, a state continues to build its positive reputation for
cooperation if it complies by the agreement’s terms. Because a state with a
negative cooperative reputation may have been excluded from the
negotiation process, it is less likely to comply with an agreement that it had
no part in creating.
Strong reputations for cooperation are most important for state actors
in multilateral, global situations where an agreement’s success or failure is
not contingent upon any one state.92 Examples of multilateral, global issues
include environmental pollution, nuclear proliferation, and internet
freedom. States known to be cooperative are more likely to be approached
by other states for input and assistance; therefore, cultivating a reputation
for cooperation is important for states that wish to have a continuous and
active voice in global policymaking. Because parties can always be coerced
into complying with international agreements even if they did not
participate in the creation of such agreements,93 a positive reputation for
cooperation affords states an opportunity to create palatable legal regimes
ex ante. A positive reputation for cooperation is less important when one
state’s consent is necessary for the potential agreement to succeed. In this
instance, the state becomes a necessary participant and state actors will
approach the state regardless of its reputation for cooperative behavior. For
example, if an agreement concerns Canadian coastal waters, then interested
state actors must ensure that Canada joins agreement negotiations and is
satisfied with the resulting agreement. Otherwise, such an agreement will
most certainly fail.
Since China is known for its strict censorship policies, China’s
reputation for cooperation with respect to internet freedom is probably
negative.94 Criticism of China’s internet policy and monikers such as the
“Great Firewall” indicate that the perception of China as a repressive state
is entrenched.95 Western countries understand that China views “the
92. Of course, an agreement relating to a multilateral, global issue would fail if the number of
noncompliant states reached a critical mass.
93. See GUZMAN, supra note 1, at 60-63.
94. Cf. id. at 75. Many state actors agree that internet freedom is a desirable norm. See, e.g.,
Internet Governance Forum 2, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, Transcript of Opening Session (Nov. 12, 2007),
available at http://www.intgovforum.org/Rio_Meeting/IGF_opening_Session.txt.
95. See, e.g., James Fallows, The Connection Has Been Reset, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 2008),
available at http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2008/03/-ldquo-the-connection-has-beenreset-rdquo/6650/; Emily Parker, Leaping the Great Firewall of China, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 24, 2010),
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Internet as a ‘core interest,’ an issue of sovereignty [on par with Taiwan
and Tibet] on which Beijing will brook no intervention.”96 The West also
views China’s unyielding reaction to Google’s announcement and
subsequent withdrawal “as a proxy for [China’s] broader confrontation
with the West over rights, trade, climate change, and declining American
hegemony.”97 Based on China’s public refusal to compromise with
Google,98 state actors should expect that China will not easily cooperate
with creating internet freedom through a new legal instrument.
Nevertheless, the United States could use the prospect of a positive
gain in China’s reputation for cooperation as a bargaining chip. On the one
hand, the United States must recognize that whether China values a
positive reputation for cooperation depends on if China believes there is
anything to gain by cooperating with the international community. China’s
increasing dominance on the world stage means that it may be unwilling to
compromise with other state actors through international law.99
Furthermore, other state actors may invite China to participate in the
creation of new legal instruments in spite of a poor reputation for
cooperation100 because of China’s economic, military, and political
strength.101 On the other hand, China has been “seeking to expand its
influence” in the international community by pursuing “a larger voice in
international organizations . . . [such as] the International Monetary
Fund . . . [and] has also begun to expand its international peacekeeping
efforts.”102 The United States should strongly emphasize to China that its
reputation for cooperation with respect to internet freedom is inextricably
tied to its reputation for cooperation in other areas of the law.103 Because a
“state’s reputation will be changed only to the extent that the state’s

available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704896104575139742687410862.html;
Austin Ramzy, The Great Firewall: China’s Web Users Battle Censorship, TIME (Apr. 13, 2010),
available at http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1981566,00.html.
96. Michael Wines, Stance by China to Limit Google is Risk by Beijing, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23,
2010), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/24/world/asia/24china.html [hereinafter Stance by
China to Limit Google is Risk by Beijing].
97. Id.
98. Mills, supra note 33.
99. Ian Bremmer, China vs America: Fight of the Century, PROSPECT (Mar. 22, 2010), available
at http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/2010/03/china-vs-america-fight-of-the-century/.
100. See id. (“[A]t December’s climate change summit in Copenhagen, . . . China spearheaded
resistance from developing states to western-proposed targets on carbon emissions.”).
101. See U.S.-CHINA ECON. AND SECURITY REV. COMMISSION, 2009 REPORT TO CONGRESS 15-17,
available at http://www.uscc.gov/annual_report/2009/annual_report_full_09.pdf.
102. Id. at 15.
103. Cf. GUZMAN, supra note 1, at 100-06.
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behavior differs from what observing states have expected,”104 China’s
refusal to create a new legal instrument on internet freedom will have no
effect on its (negative) reputation for cooperation with respect to internet
freedom. However, China’s reputation for cooperation will improve
dramatically if it collaborates with the United States to create an agreement
concerning internet freedom. China could thereby use internet freedom to
increase its reputational capital in the international community, attract the
goodwill of Western democracies, and thus leverage significantly greater
influence in the creation of international law in the future.
Foreign non-state actors care about a state’s reputation for cooperation
to the extent that it affects their business interests. Generally, a state’s
reputation for cooperation is not an important concern. When determining
whether to invest in a particular state, non-state actors are primarily
interested in the suitability of domestic conditions, such as the applicable
tax rate or the stability of a political environment.105 Thus, the interests of a
non-state actor typically do not require a state to make international
commitments.106
For certain non-state actors, however, a state’s willingness to engage
in international obligations serves as an important proxy for its
commitment toward a course of action that is valuable to the non-state
actor’s business interests. For instance, a state that has made domestic and
international commitments to internet freedom has more to lose than if it is
only willing to make domestic commitments. If a state agrees to implement
internet freedom through both domestic law and international law, then
violating internet freedom would incur not only domestic but also
international costs for that state. International law thereby signals to a nonstate actor that a state’s pledge toward a course of action is relatively more
certain.
Internet freedom is an important business interest for many non-state
actors in China. Besides Google, other foreign non-state actors have ceased
business operations in China due to China’s policies on internet freedom.107
After China increased surveillance upon domestic domain name registrants,

104. Id. at 84.
105. See MULTILATERAL INVESTMENT GUARANTEE AGENCY & DELOITTE & TOUCH, LLP,
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT SURVEY 19 tbl. 2 (2002).
106. See id.
107. See, e.g., Tim Arango, U.S. Media See a Path to India in China’s Snub, N.Y. TIMES (May 3,
2009), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/04/business/media/04media.html (“[M]any
companies have been pulling . . . [out from China because] of frustration over censorship, piracy, strict
restrictions on foreign investment and the glacial pace of its bureaucracy.”).
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GoDaddy.com (“GoDaddy”) ceased domain name registration in China.108
If GoDaddy ever decides to resume operations in China, China’s reputation
for cooperation will be important to the extent that it illustrates China’s
decision to implement internet freedom. If China later believes that
GoDaddy’s return to the Chinese market is desirable, China could woo
GoDaddy and other like-minded foreign non-state actors back to its
markets by making both domestic and international pledges to internet
freedom.109 China’s engagement with the international community would
demonstrate China’s sincere commitment to internet freedom.
B. Reciprocity
In the framework of internet freedom, reciprocity entails a costless
change in the behavior of state actors in response to China’s refusal to
create an international agreement.110 A reciprocal action allows state actors
such as the United States to maximize their own gains once they realize a
state intends to act in a certain manner.111 Previously, Guzman illustrated
the concept of reciprocity by pointing to a state’s decision to withdraw
from an existing international agreement when it discovers another state
has violated the agreement.112 Here, in the context of creating international
law, the choice a state actor faces is not whether to comply with an existing
agreement, but whether to join or devise new international law. For
example, if China refuses to enter a new agreement on internet freedom,
the United States may act reciprocally by also declining to enter the
agreement. Although the United States firmly believes in the value of
internet freedom, it may not wish to commit to the firm obligations of an
agreement. Alternatively, the United States may cease to engage China in
talks concerning the internet because it believes that China is unlikely to
change its policies on censorship in the near future. If China is reluctant to
diminish its participation in the formation of international law, this
reciprocal action may lead China to relax its internet policies.113
The newly signed Daniel Pearl Freedom of the Press Act and the
proposed Global Online Freedom Act are two examples of reciprocal
108. Ellen Nakashima & Cecilia Kang, In Response to New Rules, GoDaddy to Stop Registering
Domain Names in China, WASH. POST (Mar. 25, 2010), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-dyn/content/article/2010/03/24/AR2010032401543.html.
109. Because China has many domestic companies that offer the same services as GoDaddy.com
and Google, China may not believe it will ever be necessary to woo these non-state actors back into the
Chinese market. See infra note 121 and accompanying text.
110. Cf. GUZMAN, supra note 1, at 33.
111. Id.
112. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
113. See U.S.-CHINA ECON. AND SECURITY REV. COMMISSION, supra note 101, at 15.
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actions taken by the U.S. government in response to repressive countries
that restrict the flow of information. The Daniel Pearl Freedom of the Press
Act “requires the State Department to expand its scrutiny of news media
restrictions and intimidation as part of its annual review of human rights in
each country.”114 The Act specifically acknowledges the negative effect of
censorship on internet journalism.115 Although the annual reporting
requirement does not directly affect repressive countries, the requirement
signals to countries worldwide the importance of press freedom, including
internet freedom, to the United States.116 Such a signal may encourage
countries to relax their censorship policies and promote press freedom in
order to curry favor with the U.S. government. The proposed Global Online
Freedom Act would require non-state actors to take reciprocal actions
against repressive countries.117 Under the Act, American businesses must
disclose to the U.S. government any requests by repressive governments to
produce personally identifiable information of customers, to filter search
engine results, or to implement censorship.118 Presumably, the Global
Online Freedom Act envisions that repressive governments will relax their
censorship when faced with certain disclosure of their policies to the U.S.
government.119
Non-state actors may also engage in costless reciprocal actions in
order to adjust to—and influence—the behavior of a state. For instance,
multinational companies like Google may choose to limit their services in
response to state policies. When Google first entered the Chinese market, it
refused to offer internet services such as Gmail and Blogger until Google
could guarantee that its users’ information would remain private.120
However, these reciprocal actions will not influence China’s behavior if
China believes it can adequately rely on domestic companies to provide the
same or similar services as Google or other multinational companies.121 As
114. U.S. to Promote Press Freedom, N.Y. TIMES (May 17, 2010), available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2010/05/18/world/18press.html.
115. See Daniel Pearl Freedom of the Press Act, H.R. 1861, 111th Cong. § 2(a)(3) (2009).
116. See generally id.
117. See Global Online Freedom Act, H.R. 2271, 111th Cong. (2009). The Global Online Freedom
Act has been introduced in Congress in every session since 2007. See H.R. 2271: Global Online
Freedom Act, GOVTRACK.US, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h111-2271&tab=related.
118. H.R. 2271 §§ 203-05.
119. See id. § 2(6).
120. Andrew McLaughlin, Google in China, THE OFFICIAL GOOGLE BLOGSPOT (Jan. 27, 2006),
http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2006/01/google-in-china.html. As mentioned previously, Gmail is
Google’s web-based email service. Blogger is Google’s weblog publishing tool.
121. See David Barboza, China’s Internet Giants May Be Stuck There, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23,
2010), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/24/business/global/24internet.html; Bremmer,
supra note 99; Kathrin Hille, The Internet: A Missing Link, FIN. TIMES (London) (Jan. 19, 2010),
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long as Google is unable to provide unique services to China, then
Google’s reciprocal actions will not affect China in the information
technology market.
Joining the Global Network Initiative (“GNI”) is a reciprocal action
that non-state actors in the technology and telecommunications industry
may take to influence the behavior of states. GNI is a non-profit alliance of
“stakeholders in the global information and communications (ICT)
technology industry.”122 Members of GNI include non-state actors such as
Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo! Inc. (“Yahoo!”).123 GNI aims to achieve a
universal standard of behavior for private companies “to protect and
advance the human rights of freedom of expression and privacy when faced
with pressures from governments to take actions that infringe upon these
rights.”124 For instance, GNI policy suggests that its participants “[r]equest
that government demands to limit freedom of expression or privacy and the
legal basis for such demands [be] made in writing” and “[c]onsider[]
challenging governments in courts or other formal forums when faced with
restrictions that appear inconsistent with domestic law or international
human rights laws and standards on freedom of expression and privacy.”125
If governments know that attractive non-state actors will adhere to GNI
policies in reaction to censorship and surveillance activities, then
governments may be willing to relax their repressive information laws in
order to avoid confrontation with GNI participants.
C. Retaliation
Encouraging states to enter or create new international legal regimes
by retaliation can take various forms. For example, a retaliatory action
could be as blunt as the United States using military force to coerce China
into allowing internet freedom. In the nineteenth century, Britain forcibly
took possession of Portuguese ships to compel Portugal into ceasing its
slave trade.126 Britain also burned Brazilian ships that it suspected were

available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a7bdfbae-054b-11df-a85e-00144feabdc0.html [hereinafter The
Internet: A Missing Link].
122. Global Network Initiative, Governance Charter, 3, http://www.globalnetworkinitiative.org/
cms/uploads/1/GNI_-_Governance_Charter.pdf (last accessed Feb 10, 2011).
123. Global Network Initiative, Participants, http://www.globalnetworkinitiative.org/participants/
index.php (last accessed Feb. 10, 2011).
124. Global Network Initiative, FAQ, 1, http://www.globalnetworkinitiative.org/cms/uploads/
1/GNI_-_FAQ_PDF.pdf (last accessed Feb. 10, 2011).
125. Id. Some of the specific actions recommended by GNI, such as “challenging governments in
courts” are retaliatory. However, merely joining the GNI is still a costless action that non-state actors
may take before they begin activities in a particular state. Retaliation is discussed infra Part III.C.
126. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 63, at 116.
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trafficking slaves, prompting the Brazilian foreign minister to state: “With
the whole of the civilized world now opposed to the slave trade, and with a
powerful state like Britain intent on ending it once and for all, can we resist
the torrent? I think not.”127 The Brazilian foreign minister’s comment
suggests that a broad consensus in the international community and the
presence of a forceful hegemon can pressure China into permitting internet
freedom. However, the United States’ economic dependence upon China
and the reputational backlash that the United States would incur if it used
military force means that the United States is unlikely to elect this option.
State actors can also choose retaliatory actions subtler than outright
economic or military sanction. “Subtle” retaliation takes advantage of a
symbiotic relationship between China and the United States. The United
States must condition an attractive benefit upon the implementation of
internet freedom within Chinese borders. This method is desirable, because
China has already expressed interest in maintaining cooperation with the
United States.128 Arvind Ganesan of Human Rights Watch has noted that
the challenge of promoting internet freedom as a key human rights issue
“will be to . . . incorporat[e] internet freedom into diplomacy, trade policy,
and meaningful pressure on companies to act responsibly.”129 In other
words, if the United States can tie internet freedom to issues important to
China, then the United States may convince China that internet freedom is
crucial to the success of China’s other goals.130
Framing internet freedom as a barrier to free trade may be a promising
method to pressure China into implementing internet freedom through an
international agreement. The European Centre for International Political
Economy argues that censorship is a protectionist policy that violates the

127. Id. at 116-17.
128. A spokesperson for the Foreign Ministry of China stated that the United States and China
should continue to develop “bilateral relations, strengthen dialogue, communication and cooperation,
respect each other's core interest and great concerns, handle disputes and sensitive issues appropriately,
so as to maintain a healthy and stable development of the China-U.S. relations.” China Urges U.S. to
Stop Accusations on So-Called Internet Freedom, supra note 15.
129. US: Clinton to Press for Internet Freedom, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Jan. 21, 2010), http://
www.hrw.org/en/news/2010/01/21/us-clinton-press-internet-freedom.
130. The internet is an area that requires global coordination and therefore affords opportunity for
subtle retaliation. For instance, China has recognized that “[i]nternet security . . . [is] a global concern
which require[s] international coordinated efforts. China . . . [is] willing to deepen cooperation with
other countries and learn from their experiences . . . . China has also taken part in the Internet safety
emergency drill organized by the ASEAN countries . . . and signed cooperation pacts with member
countries of regional organizations in Asia.” Accusation of Chinese Government’s Participation in
Cyber Attack “Groundless”: Ministry, XINHUA (Jan. 25, 2010), http://news.xinhuanet.com
/english2010/china/2010-01/25/c_13149276.htm.
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General Agreement on Trade in Services.131 Google recognized this when it
repeatedly called for the U.S. government to prioritize internet freedom in
its foreign policy so as to reduce “the trade barriers of the new technology
era.”132 The First Amendment Coalition has also pressured “the U.S. Trade
Representative to file a case against China on the grounds that it has been
violating its WTO obligations . . . [for example, by] discriminat[ing]
against foreign suppliers of Internet services by blocking them at the border
while allowing domestic suppliers to offer like services.”133
The United States must consider that internet freedom is inextricably
intertwined with its security and economic interests, which may therefore
warrant some form of retaliatory action against China.134 On a macro-level,
relations between the United States and China suffer from significant
information asymmetry. Whereas China benefits from the open internet in
the United States and can exhaustively peruse American websites, the
United States can only access limited amounts of information from Chinese
websites. For instance, China’s censorship of political discourse on the
internet allows the United States to obtain only a restricted glimpse of
China’s political climate. In contrast, an open internet in the United States
allows China access to any information regarding political unrest or
criticism within the United States. As a result, China possesses a more
informed understanding of the political climate in the United States. China
has a clear advantage over the United States when the internet in China
remains closed and the internet in the United States remains open. To
131. See generally Brian Hindley & Hosuk Lee-Makiyama, Protectionism Online: Internet
Censorship and International Trade Law (Eur. Ctr. for Int’l Political Econ., Working Paper No.
12/2009).
132. Davidson Testimony, supra note 2, at 5. Google has also appealed to Congress “to bolster the
global reach and impact of our Internet information industry by placing obstacles to its growth at the top
of our trade agenda. At the risk of oversimplification, the U.S. should treat censorship as a barrier to
trade, and raise that issue in appropriate fora.” Karen Wickre, Testimony: The Internet in China, THE
OFFICIAL GOOGLE BLOG (Feb. 15, 2006), http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2006/02/testimony-internetin-china.html (citing Elliot Schrage,Vice President, Global Communic’n & Pub. Affairs, Google Inc.,
Testimony of Google Inc. before the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, and the Subcommittee on
Africa, Global Human Rights, and International Operations, Committee on International Relations,
United States House of Representatives (Feb. 15, 2006)).
133. Ronald Bailey, Battering Down the Great Firewall of China, REASON (Feb. 2, 2010),
available at http://reason.com/archives/2010/02/02/battering-down-the-great-firew. Accord FIRST
AMENDMENT COAL., CFAC BRIEFING PAPER: CHINA’S INTERNET MEASURES VIOLATE ITS WTO
OBLIGATIONS (2007).
134. Coercive action in the human rights context “usually dovetails with a powerful security or
economic interest of the coercing state. . . . and the costs of enforcement.” GOLDSMITH & POSNER,
supra note 63, at 117. Coercive action may also occur because of a “major international political
issue[].” LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE 236 (2d ed. 1979) (“Some human rights, e.g., freedom
from racial discrimination, have become major international political issues, and many governments
will be quick to react to and to seek international sanctions against violations.”).
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address this information asymmetry, the United States could consider
blocking American websites from China as long as China refuses to open
its internet. Blocking American websites from China would incur costs
upon the United States while punishing China. However, doing so would
be ideologically self-defeating, because it would undermine the United
States’ commitment to a universally open internet.135
Non-state actors may similarly retaliate against states unwilling to
engage in cooperative behavior. For example, a non-state actor could
withdraw its existing business from the state. This is retaliatory insofar as it
incurs costs on the non-state actor and punishes the state. Google retaliated
against China’s unwillingness to cease internet censorship by closing
Google.cn, re-directing mainland Chinese users to Google.com.hk, and
shutting down the majority of its mainland Chinese operations.136 Google
also began publishing online the availability of its other services (including
Gmail and Blogger) in mainland China.137 This disclosure was a retaliatory
maneuver that invited scrutiny from foreign audiences interested in
tracking Google’s services in China and, relatedly, the extent of China’s
internet censorship. By doing so, Google probably intended to deter China
from blocking Google’s services in China altogether. However, the actions
of one non-state actor alone are insufficient to achieve internet freedom.
Google’s retaliatory actions have had no short-term effect in pressuring
China to allow internet freedom. In fact, China condemned Google for its
arrogance: “China won’t let its regulations or laws bend to any companies’
[sic] threats. It is ridiculous and arrogant for an American company to
attempt to change China’s laws.”138
In the long-term, Google’s criticism may foment enough
nonreputational losses that China could consider entering an international
agreement concerning internet freedom. Google’s withdrawal “has been
pretty bad publicity for the [Chinese] government” especially because

135. See Clinton, supra note 2.
136. See Davidson Testimony, supra note 2, at 2-3.
137. Mainland China Service Availability, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/prc/report.html (last
accessed May 23, 2010). Google’s Mainland Service Availability page has since been replaced by an
online Transparency Report dedicated to show “where governments are demanding that . . . [Google]
remove content and where Google services are being blocked . . . [because] this kind of transparency
can be a deterrent to censorship.” David Drummond, Tools to Visualize Access to Information, THE
OFFICIAL GOOGLE BLOG (Sept. 20, 2010), http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2010/09/tools-to-visualizeaccess-to.html. For more information on the original Mainland China Service Availability page, see
David Drummond, A New Approach to China: an Update, THE OFFICIAL GOOGLE BLOG (Mar. 22,
2010), http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2010/03/new-approach-to-china-update.html.
138. China Doesn’t Need a Politicized Google, XINHUA (Mar. 21, 2010),
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/indepth/2010-03/21/c_13219104.htm.
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Google still has a substantial presence in China, including “tens of millions
of [Chinese] users.”139 Analysts consider Google to be “the biggest foreign
player in the market . . . [that has] raised the bar for the Internet
industry . . . [and] really helped other Chinese companies develop.”140
Many Chinese citizens appeared sympathetic to Google’s stance on internet
freedom and “laid flowers at Google offices in Beijing, Shanghai, and
Guangzhou.”141 Yet, thus far, Google appears to be the only GNI
participant that has publicly objected to censorship in China.142
Presumably, because Microsoft and Yahoo!—two other major GNI
participants143—have not joined Google in its outcry, China does not feel
sufficient pressure to amend its internet policy.144 If other influential, nonstate actors support Google and also threaten to withdraw from China, the
cost of continued internet censorship for China would be significantly
greater, and could lead to a change in Chinese internet policies.
D. Domestic Concerns
China perceives a strong domestic interest in preventing internet
freedom. Based on articles published after the Google incident, the Chinese
government believes that internet freedom creates dangerous unrest in
society, encourages separatist movements, and threatens its system of
governance.145 Indeed, China seems to fear that under a free internet
regime, the United States will outpace China’s information production
capacity and produce so much democratic propaganda that Chinese citizens

139. Google Still Threatening to Leave China (NPR radio broadcast Mar. 18, 2010) (transcript
available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=124807740).
140. Id.
141. Buruma, supra note 22.
142. See Alexei Oreskovic & Paul Eckert, Google Finds Few Allies in China Battle, REUTERS
(Mar. 25, 2010), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE62O5FS20100325.
143. See Global Network Initiative, supra note 123.
144. See Oreskovic & Eckert, supra note 142 (“Google's difficulty in enlisting allies could hint at
the challenges ahead for the world's largest search engine in China, where organizing broad support has
in the past proven to be an effective tool for negotiating with the government.”).
145. E.g., Han Dongping, From Democracy and Human Rights to Internet Freedom, CHINA DAILY
(Jan. 26, 2010), available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/thinktank/2010-01/26/content_9377250.htm
(“China is composed of 56 nationalities. Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China, Chinese
people of different nationalities have been able to live mostly in harmony except [for] a couple of riots
in Xinjiang by Ughurs and a couple of riots by Tibetan Monks in Tibets [sic], both groups with
extensive foreign connections and financial support . . . . For countries like China, internet freedom is
not simply internet freedom. It is ultimately the survival of the nation as a whole at the stake. There are
people in this world who wish that China should be fragmented into several countries. . . . What should
be the right kind of response to people who are taking advantage of internet freedom to instigate
violence?”).
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will be swayed to believe that democracy is the best form of governance.146
Thus, abstract claims in favor of internet freedom, such as “the more
information flows, the stronger the society becomes,”147 are unlikely to
persuade China because China has different baseline assumptions
concerning the value of internet freedom.
On the other hand, China could benefit domestically from permitting
internet freedom. Internet freedom could strengthen its government by
providing greater transparency to its citizens and thereby increasing
standards of government accountability.148 A policy of internet freedom
could encourage media companies such as Google and Time Warner to
expand their operations in China,149 thereby creating jobs for Chinese
citizens. The increased presence of foreign companies could develop the
skill and knowledge base of Chinese employees, and consequently foster
greater innovation and entrepreneurship in China.150 By allowing internet
freedom, China would signal to its domestic constituents and to the
international community that it is committed to technological innovation
and a legal environment that welcomes foreign technology and
telecommunications companies.
IV. HOW TO ACHIEVE INTERNET FREEDOM
By using the case of China and internet freedom as an example, this
Part describes how state and non-state actors could effectively deploy the
Three Rs of Cooperation to cause a state actor to join an international
agreement. Because the form of the agreement is inconsequential as long as
it has the ability to affect state behavior,151 achieving internet freedom in
China through international law is possible regardless of the binding or
nonbinding form of an agreement. This analysis includes an examination of
the hard and soft law forms that such an agreement could assume and still
be acceptable to China.

146. See The Real Stake in “Free Flow of Information,” supra note 5.
147. Barack Obama, U.S. President, Remarks at Town Hall Meeting with Future Chinese Leaders
(Nov. 16, 2009) (transcript available at http://www.america.gov/st/texttrans-english/2009/
November/20091116095135eaifas0.900326.html).
148. E.g., Internet Safety, Order, supra note 17. For an opinion arguing that the internet does not
encourage freedom, see Evgeny Morozov, Think Again: The Internet, FOREIGN POLICY (May-June
2010), available at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/04/26/think_again_the_internet.
149. See, e.g., Arango, supra note 107.
150. See Stance by China to Limit Google is Risk by Beijing, supra note 96 (“[Without Google
spurring innovation in China,] the vast majority of Chinese Internet companies [will] invest[] little in
research and ‘simply copy each other’s technology.’”).
151. See supra notes 79-85 and accompanying text.
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The United States and Google can most effectively persuade China to
create a new international agreement using subtle retaliation in the shortterm. Retaliation by Google alone is insufficient to convince China. Given
China’s desire to encourage “indigenous innovation,” China probably does
not find the continued presence of many foreign internet companies
particularly necessary.152 Observers have noted that the internet in China is
tailored for Chinese consumers and is therefore diverging from the internet
used in the rest of the world.153 Thus, successful retaliation may proceed in
two ways. First, state and non-state actors may threaten to withhold some
inimitable, invaluable business or benefit for which China does not have a
ready substitute. Second, state or non-state actors should act together. If
these actors together threatened to withhold benefits such as trade
opportunities, biotechnological expertise, or other unique services or
products, then China may be persuaded to allow internet freedom within its
borders. The concerted efforts of many state and non-state actors would be
a nonreputational cost that China could not easily dismiss.
Of course, China may denounce attempts to promote internet freedom
as ideologically driven, but this should not prevent the creation of a legal
instrument on internet freedom. China’s history of information control and
the underlying ideological conflict between the East and West may cause
China to view any state or non-state retaliatory action as inherently
suspicious.154 However, even bitter ideological conflict between democratic
and communist states is no obstacle to the creation of international law. For
instance, during the Cold War “there were particular interests common to
the Soviet Union and the West—in avoiding war, in limiting the spread of
nuclear weapons, in trade”—that cemented the necessity of international
law.155 Thus, while state and non-state actors should carefully address
China’s claims of informational imperialism, these claims should not be an
impediment to the development of internet freedom through a new
international agreement.
State and non-state actors may most effectively influence China’s
decision to enter an agreement using reputation in the long-term. State
actors should appeal to China’s desire to increase its influence in the
international community. They should emphasize that a positive gain in
China’s reputation for cooperative behavior with respect to internet
freedom will give China more power to craft future international law. Non152. Bremmer, supra note 99.
153. E.g., The Internet: A Missing Link, supra note 121. Accord Barboza, supra note 121 (“PostGoogle, China’s Internet market could increasingly resemble a lucrative, walled-off bazaar.”).
154. See Buruma, supra note 22; The Real Stake in “Free Flow of Information,” supra note 5.
155. HENKIN, supra note 134.
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state actors should stress that a positive reputation for cooperation will
signify China’s willingness to engage in global issues that are important to
the foreign telecommunications and technology industry. Non-state actors
should remind China that a positive reputation could consequently attract
valuable and innovative companies to the Chinese market. Because China
is known for its censorship, permitting internet freedom will dramatically
improve China’s reputation for international cooperation.
Reciprocal actions by state and non-state actors are less effective than
retaliation or reputation in the context of legally implementing internet
freedom in China. China will most likely be the subject of a State
Department report pursuant to the Daniel Pearl Freedom of the Press
Act.156 The United States could also decide not to engage China in any
negotiations concerning internet freedom. Other non-state actors could
refuse to enter the Chinese market because their business models are better
served in countries that value internet freedom.157 However, China’s
dominance on the world stage and the growth of its domestic internet and
technology companies means that the reciprocal actions of the United
States and other non-state actors are not particularly costly to China.
Both state and non-state actors interested in achieving internet
freedom should consider employing reciprocity, retaliation, and reputation
concurrently. Just as the actions of one state or non-state actor are
insufficient to reduce the perceived rewards of China’s online censorship,
the use of only one mechanism of cooperation will also be insufficient. The
U.S. government should emphasize the reputational capital that China
could gain with cooperation: uncooperative behavior may prompt China’s
exclusion from participation in future international law. Concurrently, the
U.S. government should make clear that it will be conducting surveys on
the status of print and online press freedom in China pursuant to the Daniel
Pearl Freedom of Press Act.158 The United States could link this reciprocal
action to a subtle retaliatory action, for example, by refusing to provide
benefits to China as long as the State Department believes the state of press
freedom in China is unsatisfactory. Other non-state actors should publicize
their refusal to begin or expand activities in the Chinese market due to the
government’s censorship and surveillance practices, while concurrently
highlighting the innovations and technologies that China could have
attracted with a positive reputation for cooperation with respect to internet
freedom.

156. See U.S. to Promote Press Freedom, supra note 114.
157. See Arango, supra note 107.
158. See U.S. to Promote Press Freedom, supra note 114.
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Regardless of the method or methods that state and non-state actors
choose, they will encounter the most difficulty minimizing the
nonreputational concerns discouraging China from allowing internet
freedom. China’s fears that internet freedom will destabilize its government
appear legitimate. If the full anger of Chinese citizens were ever directed
toward the government, then China might face civil unrest of a sobering
magnitude. Online phenomena such as the “Human Flesh Search
Engine”—where ordinary Netizens “hunt down and punish people who
have attracted their wrath . . . [getting] targets of a search fired from their
jobs, shamed in front of their neighbors, run out of town”159—embody the
forceful potential of populist rage and vigilantism that simmers on
anonymous Chinese web forums.
Given China’s domestic concerns, state and non-state actors may
better persuade China to join a new international agreement on internet
freedom if they choose a soft law form. China’s fear of civil instability may
deter it from entering a formal, binding multilateral treaty on internet
freedom. Even so, a hard law agreement that allows China the flexibility to
introduce increasing degrees of internet freedom may be more palatable to
China than an inflexible treaty that is effective immediately. A flexible,
non-binding soft law agreement may be more attractive to China.160
Although soft law “represent[s] a weaker form of commitment,”161
different design elements within a soft law agreement could increase the
ways in which the agreement could attract state compliance.162 Thus, in
negotiating the agreement, state and non-state actors could advocate for the
inclusion of monitoring procedures and dispute resolutions, and the
exclusion of exit or escape clauses and reservations.163 Additionally, a soft
law agreement that inextricably ties internet freedom to other concerns
such as cybersecurity or the internet’s technical infrastructure could also
increase the agreement’s compliance pull.164 Finally, even if China entered
a soft agreement with no intention of compliance, state and non-state actors
could use Guzman’s Three Rs of Compliance to encourage China’s
compliance with the agreement over time.165 A soft law agreement that
articulates the end goal of internet freedom but allows China discretion to

159. Tom Downey, China’s Cyberposse, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Mar. 3, 2010), available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2010/03/07/magazine/07Human-t.html.
160. GUZMAN, supra note 1, at 143-44.
161. Id. at 143.
162. Id. at 144.
163. See id. at 134.
164. See id. at 129.
165. See id. at 144.
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implement internet freedom on its own terms may thereby be more
successful than a binding treaty.
CONCLUSION
This Note introduced the Three Rs of Cooperation as an extension of
Guzman’s rational choice theory to explain how China might enter an
international agreement on internet freedom. This Note examined how
Guzman’s concepts of reputation, reciprocity, and retaliation evolve when
they are applied in the context of creating international law. A state’s
reputation for cooperation is built from the numerous actions that it may
take to ensure the creation and success of new international law. State and
non-state actors may engage in a variety of reciprocal or retaliatory actions
to cajole a state into cooperating with the creation of international law.
While either subtle retaliation or reputation alone is more effective than
reciprocity in convincing China to cooperate, these three mechanisms are
most effective if used together. Similarly, state and non-state actors will be
more successful if they combine their efforts to induce China’s
cooperation.
Given that China fears negative domestic payoffs from allowing
internet freedom, it will be easier to persuade China to enter an agreement
if there is some procedural flexibility built into the agreement’s terms. For
instance, state and non-state actors could propose a hard law treaty which
introduces internet freedom to China by piecemeal, thereby allowing the
Chinese government the space to resolve its fears of political instability. It
is likely easiest to convince China to enter a “non-binding” soft law
agreement. If a soft law form is used, state actors should strengthen the
agreement’s compliance pull by including design elements such as
monitoring procedures into the agreement.
Of course, the United States and Google could do nothing and simply
wait. China may one day be technologically unable to censor the internet.
The “Great Firewall” is already said to be “far from impenetrable” for
“web-savvy citizens.”166 Over time, internet censorship may become a
Danaidian task that China will be unable to sustain. Technology grows by
leaps and bounds. Although China has made tremendous efforts to censor
the internet,167 China will probably always struggle against new technology
circumventing its restrictions.

166. John Prandato, Searching for Cracks in the Great Firewall of China, PARTNERSHIP FOR A
SECURE AMERICA (Apr. 30, 2010), http://blog.psaonline.org/2010/04/30/searching-for-cracks-in-thegreat-firewall-of-china/.
167. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 28.
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Finally, in order to establish internet freedom in China, state and nonstate actors must define internet freedom unambiguously. In response to
Google and the United States’ claims that it was restricting the internet,
China countered that its citizens freely enjoyed the benefits of an open
internet.168 While the truth may lie in a gray area between these two
assertions, a clear definition is necessary so that no state may claim to be
upholding internet freedom when it is in fact not. The Chinese constitution
already protects the freedom of expression;169 it is up to Google and the
United States to translate this protection into reality. If state and non-state
actors define internet freedom carefully, internet freedom as an
international obligation also has fruitful implications for the softening of
digital rights management regimes. Internet freedom may thereby prove to
be a potent weapon with which to defend the freedom of expression and the
public domain.

168. See, e.g., China Urges U.S. to Stop Accusations on So-Called Internet Freedom, supra note
15.
169. XIAN FA [Constitution] art. 35 (1982) (P.R.C.), available at http://www.oceanalaw.com
(“Citizens of the People’s Republic of China enjoy freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, of
association, of procession and of demonstration.”); id. art. 41 (“Citizens of the People’s Republic of
China have the right to criticize and make suggestions to any state organ or functionary.”).

